MNCs are likely to view foreign direct investment (FDI) in emerging economies as a major component of their cost minimization policies. As such, corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives, which are used by MNCs as a key source to gain sustainable competitive advantage in developed countries may get diluted in emerging economies. Such a myopic view may enhance short-term profits, but would not ensure long-term sustainability. Most of the research on CSR has focused on the strategies of companies in the developed world. The literature on MNCs in developing economies and CSR is still embryonic. As CSR becomes increasingly important to MNCs, it is crucial to understand how MNCs' subsidiaries approach CSR in emerging markets so as to realize the challenges MNCs' subsidiaries face in aligning their CSR approach with local practices. The questions of how MNCs' subsidiaries approach CSR in emerging markets and how they adapt to local CSR practices remain largely under-explored. Another area of recent research pertains to MNC CSR in 'conflict zones' and their potential.
Can the otherwise mutually conflicting objectives of Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Financial Performance be seen going hand in hand in such 'conflict zones'? Can a cause-effect relationship be posited, especially in such conflict zones, with the success of the latter riding on a satisfactory performance of the former? This paper analyses the CSR practices followed by HUL in its unit in DoomDooma, Assam in the period 2001-2004, a period which was one of the most tumultuous periods in the history of HUL operation in India. The largest personal care products factory set up in DoomDooma to take advantage of the government's concessions to encourage the region's development, witnessed serious challenges in the form of local bandhs (closures), followed by an attack by the militant group, ULFA. Yet, the productivity contribution of the Assam factory was one of the highest and in fact was responsible for the company's top line growth.
It is suggested that the financial performance was due in no small measure, to the corporate responsibility measures undertaken internally and externally by the company. The former consisted of the measures undertaken vis-à-vis the key stakeholders, viz. employees, consumers, ecosystem, and business partners while the external CR measures were with respect to the specific CSR initiatives undertaken keeping in mind the needs and expectations of the local community. Thus, the company's CR initiatives helped in sustainable growth. G lobalization is redefining the boundaries of Multinational Corporation (MNC) investments. In 2010, half of the top 20 host economies for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) were developing or transition economies (UNCTAD, 2011, p.13) . FDI flows have taken place despite the presence of significant challenges in these economies in the form of the presence of underdeveloped institutional and regulatory environments, weak public governance, widespread bribery and corruption, and scant respect for human rights. The presence of a 'resource curse' and the consequent violent conflicts over the use of scarce resources are the other challenges in the emerging markets (Sachs & Warner, 2001; Mehlum, Moene, & Torvik, 2006) . MNCs have used Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as a tool for gaining sustainable competitive advantage in developed countries. However, such CSR may be diluted or rendered ineffective, given the business environment in emerging economies, together with the rationale of investments therein.
Several researchers point out that the study of CSR in MNCs has been skewed towards strategies used in the developed world (Quazi & O'Brien, 2000; Rodriguez, Siegel, Hillman, & Eden, 2006; Yang & Rivers, 2009 ) while research pertaining to developing economies has been "embryonic" (Yang & Rivers, 2009, p.155) . Even more embryonic is the literature pertaining to CSR research in the conflict zones of the emerging economies. This may be on account of ".... the difficulty of doing research in countries where governance and institutional structures are in flux, and where violent conflicts are prevalent...." (Kolk & Lenfant, 2010, p.242 ).
Even such literature as available (Wheeler, Rechtman, Fabig, & Boele, 2001; Wheeler, Fabig, & Boele, 2002; Eweje, 2006; Ite, 2004; Idemudia, 2009; Idemudia, 2011) pertains to the use of CSR as a development tool by companies operating mainly in the extractive industries of conflict-ridden African/Asian countries, characterized by largely authoritarian regimes/military junta. Research on MNC operations in such 'conflict zones' within democracies like India, which have been battling with internal strife in the form of Naxalite movements, as also militancy in various parts of the country at various time periods, is non-existent. This paper seeks to expand the base of knowledge and fill this void in the existing CSR literature by examining how, for MNCs, CSR acts as a business tool in conflict zones of emerging economies.
The main research questions addressed are:
What strategic initiatives can a firm take to operate successfully in conflict zones of emerging economies? Can there be a business case for CSR in such conflict zones?
The paper investigates whether firms operating in conflict zones can survive and sustain profitable business operations in the midst of a conflict using the tool of CSR. i The objective is to see if an MNC can, through the employment of CSR, gain acceptability of a community which is confronted with social challenges and conflict, and in turn, can use such legitimacy for enhancing the value of its stakeholders. It does so by carrying out an in-depth study of one of the oldest MNCs and the largest Fast Moving Consumer Goods (FMCG) company operating in India -Hindustan Unilever Limited (HUL), following the case study method of analysis. The case pertains to the CSR initiatives undertaken by HUL in its unit in Doom Dooma, Assam in the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] .
LITERATURE REVIEW MNC CSR in Emerging Economy Conflict Zones
Recent research in the area of CSR in MNCs revolves around the 'conflict prone economies/zones'of the emerging economies, which are ''countries [that are] in, emerging from, or at risk of violent conflict, being expressed either as civil war or at more localized levels'' (Jamali & Mirshak, 2010, p.445) .
The overriding theme of such research is that of 'CSR as a development (and/or conflict mitigation) tool in conflict zones', with opinions on the subject being mixed. The detractors (primarily Africa-centric studies) cite cases of oil companies such as Talisman, Shell, Exxon Mobil, AGIP, Elf, and Total to point out that the use of CSR by MNCs is fraught with problems on account of the conflicting interests of business and the local communities (Idahosa, 2002; Idemudia, 2009; Watts, 2005) . Such studies also point to the business-state nexus and the role of transnational companies in escalating conflict in such "petro states"-"rentier states, in which oil revenues accounted for a significant proportion of GDP and a larger percentage of both government and export revenues" (Watts, 2005, p.384) . They dismiss the claims of doing good through CSR programmes, as "just a chimera" "......with 'cash payments'-payments to chiefs, politicians and youth groups to secure the flow of oil -often dwarfing the actual budget of community development projects" (Watts, 2005, p.399-400) .
There are others, however, who point to the positive involvement of MNCs as "good corporate citizens" in Africa (Sullivan,2003; Fortanier & Kolk, 2007) or even in the extreme scenario of military junta regimes such as in Myanmar (Holliday, 2005) , with MNC CSR activities having the potential to actually help in "conflict mitigation and peace building" (Jamali & Mirshak, 2010, p.444) . A similar theme of regional stability being promoted through MNC partnerships with governments, NGOs and the civil society has been explored by others as well (e.g. Bennett, 2002) .
The existing literature also dwells on the factors and risks relevant to MNC decision-making in conflict areas (Jamali & Mirshak, 2010, p.447 ). Nelson's (2000, p.7) pyramidal model describes three strategies of corporate responsibility as essential for businesses operating in conflict zones -a minimal 'compliance strategy' at the bottom layer, followed by a risk minimization or 'do no harm' strategy and a value creation or 'peace building' strategy at the top-most layer (Figure 1) . It is at this layer of societal valueaddition that the role of CSR is truly envisaged. 
Bridging the Gap
Extant literature has largely focused on the role of CSR as a development tool (or the lack of it) from the perspective of the countries concerned, especially those characterized by authoritarian regimes. Such CSR, as was carried out, was reactive and meant to mitigate, more often than not, the excesses committed. These questions have not been addressed so far; this research will thus add to the knowledge-base in the domain of CSR in MNCs. Further, unlike most of the existing studies, it is conducted in India which subscribes to democratic polity. The focus on a democratic society should bring additional insights and thus should be of interest to scholars, practitioners, and policy makers.
METHODOLOGY
This paper follows a case-study method of analysis. Balasubramanian, Kimber, and Siemensma (2005) point to the lack of a detailed case study analysis of CSR in the Indian context. The few studies relating CSR to firms' financial performance (and thus providing the business case for CSR) have been based on annual reports and are quantitative in nature (Mittal, Sinha, & Singh, 2008) . Detailed analyses of such linkages, especially in conflict zones in democracies like India, are not available. This gap in literature provides us the rationale to choose a qualitative, rather than a quantitative mode of research.
Since the purpose of this research is to undertake an indepth study of the practice of CSR in conflict zones, following Yin (1994) ,the case study research method has been followed, using direct observation (based on the author's personal experiences in the North-East) and indepth interviews to obtain the database needed to carry out this research. 3 The North-East, with its continuing insurgency, provides a case to examine CSR operations and their impact in mature democracies like India. The choice of the MNC, viz. Hindustan Unilever, is based on the author's personal experience vis-a-vis the company's operations in the conflict zone of North-Eastern India in the period concerned. The HUL unit, located in Doom Dooma and chosen for the purpose of study, actually experienced the effects of the militancy activities affecting the state of Assam. While there was no dearth of companies operating in Assam, especially in the plantations business, strategic CSR was practically non-existent.
In addition to the main research questions mentioned earlier, this paper addresses the ancillary question:
How did the company ensure sustainability of operations in the light of the growing militancy activity and external strife in the region?
The objective of the research is to present the conditions and manner in which CSR can be used as a business tool to secure competitive advantage, rather than simply positing and proving, through quantitative analysis, a causeeffect relationship between CSR, Corporate Social Performance (CSP), and Corporate Financial Performance (CFP).
An exhaustive survey of existing literature on the subject of CSR provides the extant theories on the subject.
The study relies on the following sources of evidence:
Documentation -It comprises of:
• Internal documents that were made available by HUL/ HUL unit on the various aspects that were covered in the study. These have been appropriately documented in the Case/Annexure. • Company's Annual Reports and Sustainability Reports.
• Newspaper clippings and other articles appearing in the mass media e.g. The Times of India, Economic Times, DNA, etc.
Archival Records -These include:
• Survey data -collected by the manufacturing unit and which provide the data pertaining to various activities undertaken.
• Company publications -e.g. the publication to commemorate 75 years of HUL.
Interviews -These constituted the most important source of information and were based on the case study protocol. Strategic sampling was used to select the sample of informants, including people who could shed light on the research topic at hand, rather than on the basis of representativeness in statistical terms. 4 In-depth interviews, conducted in the respondents' offices in Mumbai during , were largely open-ended and conversational though the set of questions used was derived from the case study protocol. Some of these interviews, usually for a period ranging from half an hour to three hours, were also followed by telephone conversations to fill in gaps and clarify points noted during the interview. Mechanical devices were not used for recording the interviews. On request, a particular piece of information was categorized under the company's 'No Disclosure Agreement' clause. Two of these interviews were taken on telephone and the required additional quantitative data was provided by the concerned officials through e-mail in response to specific questions.
The author's personal experiences in Doom Dooma during the period 2002-2004, provided additional evidentiary basis for this research.
The following principles enunciated by Yin (1994, p. 90-99) were adopted while carrying out data collection:
• Using multiple sources of evidence, including direct observation, personal interviews, mass media reports, company publications and internal company sources, in conjunction with each other. These sources converged on the same set of findings.
• Creating a case study database, including the notes taken, the case study documents collected, the narratives of some respondents as also the tabular material gathered. Such material was organized and stored for later retrieval.
• Maintaining a chain of evidence by linking the information collected to the research questions derived from the theory to the extent possible.
The analysis being a descriptive case study, the focus was on ensuring the quality of the research design primarily through construct validity and reliability. The former was ensured through using multiple sources of evidence and building a chain of evidence. Once the case study was written, the draft report was sent back to the respondents. This helped in improving the quality of the case study and also ensured its construct validity and reliability. Their comments and suggestions were incorporated in the final report. 
Doom Dooma CR: Areas and Activities
The setting up of the factory led to a rapid growth of Doom Dooma in just 10-12 months. The large scale of operations increased the visibility of the company, which realized that it would have to contend with growing societal expectations. Hence, in keeping with its CR policy and as a proactive measure, the company decided to get involved in a few (but important and relevant) social activities of Doom Dooma. This would help build a lasting relationship with the community and in turn would have a positive influence on the functioning of the factory.
The company's plantation operation, in its long existence, had been involved in a number of community-related activities in the past. However, these activities, besides being one-off events, did not have the reach of the new CR programme envisaged.
The company considered a number of projects and based on a survey of the local needs and expectations, finalized the project of providing a mobile medical facilitySanjivani, keeping in mind the lack of quality medical facilities in and around Doom Dooma. Another project taken up was Ankur.
Sanjivani
The company sought to implement Sanjivani in towns/ villages within a radius of 30 km in Doom Dooma. Although government-run primary health centres were present in these towns/villages, necessary medical facilities were not adequate. Schools/playgrounds in these villages could serve as possible sites for setting up medical camps. The company recognized the contribution of a large proportion of the factory employees from these villages. The project entailed a budgeted capital expenditure of `5 million and a revenue expenditure of `4 million per annum. The scheme was expected to provide medical facilities to more than 25,000 patients with a similar number being covered in the vaccination camps. Various stakeholders, including the factory HR team, the plantation team, the local administration and the local sarpanch were responsible for the smooth implementation of the programme. 
Progress of Sanjivani

Ankur
The personal products factory at Doom Dooma undertook another CR project, Ankur, a school that provided special education and rehabilitative training for physically and mentally challenged children. Started in March 1993 and initially run by the HUL Plantation, Ankur today has trained and qualified full-time teachers and helpers drawn from the company's employee families. The school provides vocational training in embroidery, crochet, needlework, handicrafts, painting, etc. Items made by the children are sold and proceeds from these sales are deposited against the children's names in the local post office. Ankur provides transportation for the children to and from their houses, medical aid, food, uniforms, toys and other facilities, free of charge. Table 1 , adapted from Jamali and Mirshak (2010, p.447) , analyses the factors and risks relevant to Hindustan Unilever's decision-making in the conflict zone of Doom Dooma, which was the hub of significant militant activity facing serious security and economic risks. iv Yet, HUL's decisions pertaining to investment in the zone crucially depended on factors such as the government's (as well as the opposition's) pro-investment stance in the form of fiscal subsidies and military support, huge market potential, favourable development indicators (such as literacy), and its own prior experience in the zone. The HUL Doom Dooma unit was set up after a thorough risk analysis and consideration of its salient factors.
Analysis of CSR/CR and Inferences
The factory adhered to the Unilever Code of Business Practices (CoBP) which restricted it from resorting to 'questionable practices', including payment of bribes and extortion demands, even in a country/region where a weak governance and institutional mechanism may mandate recourse to the same.
In fact, it is common knowledge that the tea planters in Assam would regularly pay such amounts to the ULFA to ensure peaceful operation of their business. Tata Tea allegedly had to pay ransom amounts to keep ULFA at bay and even accounted for them in its balance sheet as "security overheads. (Tables A3 and A4 , Annexure I), with Assam remaining the hot bed of militant ULFA activity throughout.
Despite the risk analysis, the very existence of the factory was threatened in September 2003, when it received an extortion note from the ULFA followed by an attack on the residential officers' colony by a Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) device. The company, as part of its CoBP, and with the support of the state government, decided not to succumb to the pressure and continued the factory operations. 9
The HR manager of the factory during the 2001-04 period revealed that the extortion note had in fact cast serious doubts about the continuation of 'Sanjivani' (Phone interview, July 25, 2010). It was the local community support which ensured its success. On receipt of the extortion note, HUL approached the state and the central governments, which provided its operations with a security cover. It also discussed with the local sarpanches and on the basis of their assurance, decided to continue with the Sanjivani operations. In the aftermath of the RPG attack, the company dispelled any uncertainty regarding its Assam operations by communicating to the workers and internal stakeholders their decision to continue, without succumbing to the ULFA pressures. The value-creation through Sanjivani, and the resultant goodwill and legitimacy provided to the CR initiatives by the local community, the support by the state and the internal stakeholders had a spill-over effect on the conduct of business as well.
iv The 28th battalion of ULFA, considered as its most notorious wing, operated in the jungles bordering Burma and the area including Doom Dooma.
HUL sought to mitigate the risks pertaining to operations in a conflict zone by following a strategic value creation approach of CSR based on the needs and expectations of its various stakeholders, particularly the local community where it operated. Table 2 adapts Nelson's five principles to discuss the value-creation approach followed by HUL.
The CR initiatives in themselves merely helped to fill the gap in the availability of quality medical services in the area of investment. In this sense, they neither aimed to, nor achieved, supplanting the role of the state in the provision of a public good. However, HUL was successful in deriving the acceptance, legitimacy, and cooperation to carry out sustainable business operations in the midst of conflict through the process of value-creation itself. In this context, what is of significance is not merely the outcome of the value-creation per se (viz. provision of health facilities), but also the process of value creation. Table 2 enunciates the process of HUL's strategic value creation approach in terms of its key elements: strategic commitment to CSR issues, risk and salient factor analysis, identification of key areas of CSR, dialogue and consultation with key stakeholders, evolving a support base, and evaluation of the costs and benefits (both proximate and ultimate) of the CR initatives.
HUL was able to successfully create one of its largest operations, and ramp up its production in this conflict zone, especially during a period of extreme external strife, due to such a value creation strategy of CR. On perusal of the production data, we find that there is a continuous in- crease in the production volume, as also in the variety of personal care products produced in the factory. This illustrates the company's ability to utilize its full capacity within a very short period. v Table A5 (Annexure I) lists out, additionally, the gross sales of the company during the period concerned as also the segment-wise sales. While gross sales and sales of most other segments fell, the share of personal care products rose throughout the period concerned. The rising production volumes of the Doom Dooma factory attest the significance of the Assam factory in the overall business. The growth in the number of Stock Keeping Units (SKUs) demonstrates the growing complexity of operations.
In fact, initially the company envisaged only a scheme of small operations. However, the stability and profitability of operations prompted the company to expand capacity and enlarge the complexity of operations, reflected in higher production volumes as also the larger number of SKUs.
We can infer the importance of the Doom Dooma factory to HUL (Figure 3 ) from the following statements (Singh, 2007 ):
• The Home and Personal Care (HPC) segment contributes 80 percent to the company's top line (Singh,2007 Assam factory produces 30 percent of the personal care products by volume." (Singh, 2007) .
• In fact, in 2007, a seven-week lockout in the Doom Dooma factory was stated to be one of the major factors responsible for the fall in the net profit of HUL by 21.6 percent to `4.08 billion.
The significance of the Doom Dooma operations to HUL becomes greater in the context of developments in the Indian FMCG sector in the period. The tobacco major, ITC, entered the FMCG space in the year 2000-01 to compete in categories dominated by HUL-soaps, detergents, personal care products, and packaged food. 
INFERENCES
There is no evidence of a dilution of MNC CSR activities on account of operations in emerging economies. Instead, a well-conceived CR strategy based on local considerations seems to be in place.
HUL's decision to invest in Assam mirrored similar decisions taken since 1977 to invest in backward regions of the country with a view to derive competitive advantage. The company followed a strategic value-creation approach of CSR/CR in Assam to mitigate the effect of conflict on sustainable business operations, which in turn provided it with a basis for competitive advantage.
Going beyond compliance and 'do no harm', the top leadership, both at the local and country levels, followed various signalling mechanisms, such as adherence to CoBP, to demonstrate their commitment to CSR. Areas of CSR were identified on the basis of the needs and expectations analysis of the local community. Key stakeholders were made partners in the process of the area identification and delivery mechanism.
The number of beneficiaries can provide a rough measure of the impact of the CR activities undertaken by the firm and hence its Corporate Social Performance (CSP). It is clear that the company's CR activities and the resulting CSP provided it the legitimacy contributing to its financial performance. However, at this stage, we are not in a position to demonstrate quantitatively, a one-to-one CSR-CSP/ CSP-CFP relationship.
What is evident is that the strategic approach to CSR allowed HUL to set up its largest manufacturing operations in the period concerned in a 'conflict zone', ramp up production volumes and complexity, thus benefitting from the fiscal incentives offered by the state, in a manner that provided it with a competitive advantage in the FMCG sector. The very fact that the company rapidly commissioned the second and third phases of investment, is a testimony to the profitability of operations in the conflict zone marked (at the very least) by regular bandhs as crore of free cash from the cigarette business), management bandwidth and the vision to change its face from a tobacco company to a diversified consumer giant. Market leadership as well as the relative inelasticity of cigarette demand gave ITC a huge pricing power" (Dobhal & Mukherjee, 2005) . vi Sustained operations in zones offering tax concessions and the resultant cost reductions assume importance in the wake of these developments.
We infer that the CSR (CR) initiatives undertaken by the company, contributed in no small measure, to its legitimacy within the local community and continued smooth operations, which in turn, provided it a competitive advantage. Despite the direct attack by the militant group-ULFA, the company decided to continue its operations.
The period also witnessed considerable disruption on account of bandhs in the region, with a loss of about 25 man-days on an average per annum during this troubled period. However, such loss in the PP factory was nil. The factory continued its six-days a week, three-shifts a day production schedule even during the height of militancy in Assam. The production figures for the period reveal a sustained increase in production, contributing both to the top line as well as the bottom-line growth of the company.
As a former executive from the senior management, HUL informed us, "The company's continued operations during the militancy activities were on account of the soft measures (CR -Sanjivani and Ankur) that the company adopted" (Personal interview, May 2, 2010). also a direct militant attack. It was the success of CR operations and the consequent stable production scenario that prompted the company to expand capacity and increase its complexity of operations.
Thus, MNCs with their scale economies and driven by the desire to maximize profits, may use CSR as a strategic business tool to ensure continued operations in Conflict Zones, where the initial impetus to invest may be provided by economic and other incentives.
In this study, we do not claim that HUL's CSR was accomplished at any sacrifice to HUL; instead we examine and show that both HUL and Doom Dooma have largely benefited from such CSR.
CONCLUSION
The goal of this paper was to examine whether MNCs operating in conflict zones could employ CSR to create value both for themselves and for the local community in which they operated, such that the value creation provided the basis for continuous sustainable and even profitable business operations in the midst of conflict. This research finds that it is indeed possible for a firm to do so. It provides an interesting managerial insight that community service does not have to be accomplished at the cost of a firm's financial interest and in fact helps it operate in conflict zones. This paper challenges the implicit notion in extant literature that a study of MNC CSR in conflict zones is relevant only to authoritarian regimes. While most authoritarian regimes produce conflicts, so do mature democracies. The presence of democracy and relative political certainty, together with the growing wealth (and hence purchasing power), as also lower labour and operational costs in emerging economies represent significant factors determining the flow of FDI both within and among nations. Continuing conflicts may act as serious deterrents to such investments. This paper takes a firm perspective to enunciate that despite significant risks and attendant costs, MNCs (as also domestic firms) which can reap substantial scale economies, can use CSR to 'create value' for its key stakeholders. vii Such value creation can provide them the legitimacy to carry on sustainable business operations in the midst of conflict. In this context, what may be relevant is not just 'what' is created, but 'how' it is created. The process of value creation as also the outcomes generated as a result of such value creation can inform existing wisdom on the impact and potential of CSR as a competitive strategy.
This research shows that significant investment in CSR operations, based on a carefully designed need-expectations analysis in such conflict zones, not only makes business possible, but also profitable, thus making a case for CSR in conflict zones. Future studies contrasting MNC versus local firms in conflict zones may provide interesting insights not only for corporate strategy, but for development economics as well.
vii In doing so, we follow a prescriptive, rather than a normative stance. 
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